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INTRODUCTION

Over forty years ago, in the Symposium we commemorate today,
Professor Karl Llewellyn wrote a devastating critique of the canons of
statutory construction.1 For virtually every canon of construction, he
demonstrated that there was another canon that could be employed to
reach the opposite result.2 His point was not to be critical, but to argue
*

Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B., J.D., University of California (Berkeley).

Some of the suggestions made in this article appeared previously as part of testimony I gave to a
congressional hearing. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 97-127 (1990). In addition to many
helpful comments by the participants at the Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium, the author
wishes to thank Kit Kinports for her typically tremendous editing job on an earlier draft, and J.
Pieter van Es for research assistance.
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
2. Id. at 401-06.
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proscriptively that the process of statutory construction requires an interpretation in light of a judicial determination of "some assumed
purpose."'
Other commentators, both before and after the publication of
Llewellyn's magnificent contribution to the Vanderbilt Law Review,
have taken a different approach. These observers have focused, in a
critical way, on judicial abuse of the canons whose indeterminacy Llewellyn so brilliantly exposed. Over a century ago, British jurisprude Sir
Frederick Pollock wrote that canons "cannot well be accounted for except on the theory that Parliament generally changes the law for the
worse, and that the business of the judges is to keep the mischief of its
interference within the narrowest possible bounds."'4 At the height of
conservative judicial activism colloquially known as the Lochner era,
Professor James Landis warned that the "real difficulty" in statutory
interpretation was that "strong judges prefer to override the intent of
the legislature in order to make law according to their own views. ' ' 5
More recently, Judge Patricia Wald's careful survey of the Supreme
Court's interpretive behavior concluded that "legislative history is often
rejected in favor of, or at least filtered through, canons, presumptions,
or principles considered overriding by a majority of the Court." Focusing specifically on the legisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, Professor William Eskridge likewise concluded that Scalia's selective use of
canons "will often be more arbitrary and less constraining than that of
'7
the traditional approach."
In sum, these observers do not merely confirm Llewellyn's view
that canons of statutory interpretation are subject to abuse; they suggest in addition that canons have actually been abused as part of the
judiciary's systematic attempt to frustrate legislative policy preferences.
As I have written elsewhere, we are currently witnessing another period
characterized by a conservative judiciary and a Congress dominated by
more liberal legislators." The purpose of this paper is to explore what, if
anything, Congress should do about the canons to prevent judges who
are more conservative (or perhaps, in a future era, more progressive)
than the majority of the legislature from employing those canons to distort or frustrate legislative policy preferences.
3. Id. at 400.
4. Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics 85 (MacMillan and Co., 1882).
5. James M. Landis, A Note on "StatutoryInterpretation,"43 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 890 (1930).
6. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 207 (1983).
7. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 676 (1990).
8. Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism -Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 399. See also
Abner J. Mikva and Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 729 (1991).
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THE USE OF NORMATIVE CANONS

Many commentators have correctly observed that the canons serve

a number of functions,' but I believe they are best understood as falling
into two discrete categories: descriptive canons and normative canons.
Descriptive canons are principles that involve predictions as to what
the legislature must have meant, or probably meant, by employing particular statutory language. These canons may be directed to the judiciary expressly by statute or created by the courts themselves. Rules of
syntax or grammar, principles that statutory provisions should be read

to avoid internal inconsistency or conflict with other enactments, or canons such as ejusdem generis1 ° are examples of descriptive canons. A
judge deploying a descriptive canon is attempting to act as an agent to
effectuate congressional intent."1
In contrast, normative canons are principles, created in the federal
system exclusively by judges, that do not purport to describe accurately
what Congress actually intended or what the words of a statute mean,
but rather direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular way
in order to further some policy objective."2 Judge Wald provided a classic example of a normative canon when she observed that judges often
presume "that Congress did not intend to interfere with the traditional
power and authority of the states unless it signaled its intention in neon
'1 3
lights.
Especially today, normative canons require careful consideration.
They clearly reflect judicial, not congressional, policy concerns; nowhere in the United States Code is there any congressional endorse9. See Reed Dickerson, The Interpretationand Application of Statutes 228 (Little, Brown,
1975); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 407,

454-59 (1989); Wald, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 207 & n.92 (cited in note 6).
10. This canon states that general language following a list of specific terms should be interpreted in light of the specific terms.
11. An example of this approach to judging was articulated by Judge Patricia Wald: "When a
statute comes before me to be interpreted, I want first and foremost to get the interpretation right.
By that, I mean simply this: I want to advance rather than impede or frustrate the will of Congress." Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 301
(1990). See also Schooner Paulinav. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812) (stating that
"[i]n construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature").
12. Some canons may both accurately describe congressional behavior and reflect judicial
norms of how legislation should be read. For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 191-92 (1978), the Supreme Court held that appropriations measures will be presumed
not to amend substantive statutes. This presumption reflects both an understanding of Congress's
intent, based on House and Senate rules prohibiting substantive legislation on appropriations bills,
and normative arguments that statutes should be construed to limit casual, ill-considered, or interest-driven measures that may be easier to attach to appropriations statutes.
13. Wald, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 208 (cited in note 6).
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ment of these canons. 14 They can, however, be justified under theories
expounded by several of today's leading legisprudential theorists.
In a series of articles, for example, Professor William Eskridge has
advocated that courts should approach statutory interpretation in a dynamic manner, giving effect to contemporary public values. 15 Eskridge
catalogues a host of normative rules of interpretation that openly and
candidly reflect the perspectives of the Supreme Court's contemporary
majority. When a judge of today reads a statute passed yesterday, using
these canons furthers the inevitable interpretive process, contributes to
the moral worth of society, fulfills the republican ideal of achieving the
common good through practical reason and dialogue between the courts
and legislatures, and
corrects what Professor Cass Sunstein has called
"statutory failure.' 1 6 Thus, the hostility of the English law lords to actions of Parliament led to a normative canon that statutes in derogation
of the common law should be construed narrowly, a normative canon
that is no longer widely employed. 17 Today's judiciary, for example, espouses values solicitous of states' rights and thus narrowly construes
statutes in derogation of traditional state prerogatives.' 8
Another leading scholar, Professor Jonathan Macey, has advocated
what I call "strategic interpretation," in response to considerable criticism of the legal process theory-that theory calls for construction consistent with the public purpose that can be discerned from a statute.
Macey argues that construing statutes consistently with their apparent
public purposes will promote Madisonian notions, embodied in our con14. Title 1 of the United States Code lists a few interpretive canons. The first section provides general definitions of commonly used words. The other sections define "county," "vessel,"
"vehicle," "company,". "association," and "products of American fisheries." 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1988).
15. Professor Eskridge is so prolific that I hesitate to slight his canon by omission. My two
personal favorites are William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1007 (1989) ("Public Values") and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,"135U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987).
16. Public Values, at 1019-61 (cited in note 15). See Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 466-67,
476-89 (cited in note 9).
17. Compare Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) with Shaw v. Railroad
Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879). In Isbrandtsen, a seaman sued for unpaid wages pursuant to a federal statute permitting such suits in federal court. 343 U.S. at 783. The Supreme Court held that
the employer's effort to apply a set-off for damages caused by the seaman, which clearly existed
under the common law of admiralty, was implicitly barred under a federal statutory scheme
designed to change the common law "so as to improve the lot of seamen." Id. In contrast, in Shaw,
the Court held that a state statute equating bills of lading with negotiable promissory notes did
not change the common law's denial of title to holders of bills of lading when the true owner of the
property contested the title of the holder. 101 U.S. at 565. The case arose because a prior seller of
the bill of lading had obtained it by fraud. Id. at 558. The Court reached its decision in Shaw
without any examination of the legislative purpose in enacting the statute, which was to promote
the marketability of bills of lading by giving them full negotiability. (My thanks to my colleagues
Steve Harris and John Dolan of the Wayne State University School of Law for these insights).
18. Wald, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 208-09 (cited in note 6).
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stitutional system, of how legislation should work. For example, construing ambiguous statutory provisions in ways that do not permit
private interest groups to gain more, at the public expense, than they
clearly received from the statutory text serves these Madisonian
values.1 9
Combining Eskridge's and Macey's normative arguments with the
practical assertions that language "by itself" lacks meaning and that
gaps and ambiguities in statutes are inevitable, Professor Cass Sunstein20 argues that "[i]nterpretation cannot occur without background
principles that fill gaps in the face of legislative silence and provide the
backdrop against which to read linguistic commands."' 2 1 Sunstein also
catalogues a host of normative principles that improve the lawmaking
process by minimizing judicial and administrative discretion or by asserting a desirable influence on the process itself. Some of these principles also advance a number of substantive goals that courts identify as
desirable.2 2 These "substantive" norms, a major subset of what I have
called the normative canons, roughly track Eskridge's public values and
are drawn from constitutional principles, institutional concerns, and the
desire to "combat characteristic pathologies in regulatory legislation. 2 3
What is ironic, however, about this exploration of normative canons is that their justification must be rooted in a sense of the judicial
role that is, on today's ideological spectrum, at least moderately activist. Professor Sunstein, for example, who has endorsed a plethora of
normative canons, expressly rejects the metaphor of the judge as an
agent carrying out Congress's will.2 4 Presidents Reagan and Bush have
insisted, however, that their judicial nominees must faithfully interpret
and not legislate. Their most recent Supreme Court nominee, now Justice Clarence Thomas, espoused his adherence to this philosophy that
statutory interpretation only involves faithfully carrying out what Congress means.2 5 Justice Thomas followed Justices Scalia and Souter, who,
at their confirmation hearings, pledged their fealty to legislative intent.28 Yet there is absolutely no evidence that the use of normative
19. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986).
20. Fittingly, Professor Sunstein is the University of Chicago's Llewellyn Professor of
Jurisprudence.
21. Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 504 (cited in note 9).
22. Id. at 457.
23. Id. at 476.
24. Id. at 437.
25. See Joan Biskupic, Minuet With Congress, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2622 (Sept. 14, 1991).
26. See Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 130
(1990) (remarks of Sen. Dennis DeConcini) (quoting Justice-designate David Souter's answer to a
committee questionnaire, stating that the "foundation of judicial responsibility in statutory inter-
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canons has declined as the Court has become more conservative. Indeed, Judge Wald's empirical studies demonstrate that this is not the
case. 27 Moreover, Professor Eskridge has appropriately derided the
Court's aggressive application of a newly developed normative canon,
requiring an express statutory abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
to statutes passed prior to the promulgation of this canon. Eskridge describes this action as "bait-and-switch.

'2

It is difficult to see how those

who ascribe to the philosophy of judicial restraint advocated by President Bush at press conferences and by Republican nominees at their
confirmation hearings can continue to use normative canons at all.
III.

POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO SOME NORMATIVE CANONS

The only way for Congress to prevent the continued use of normative canons with which it disagrees is to enact an amendment to Title I
of the United States Code that expressly provides for different rules of
construction.29 In earlier days legislatures responded with statutory action to the now defunct normative canon that narrowly construed statutes in derogation of the common law. The California legislature, for
example, adopted a statutory provision expressly rejecting this maxim
and instead directing courts that the Civil Code was "to be liberally
3' 0
construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
Pennsylvania similarly has enacted a comprehensive set of rules for
statutory construction, including rules that direct courts on materials to
be used to divine legislative intent 3 establish normative presumptions
for courts to use,32 and dictate when courts should engage in liberal or
strict construction. 3
pretation is respect for the enacted text and for the legislative purpose that may explain a text
that is unclear") (emphasis added); id. at 132-33 (testimony of Justice-designate Souter) (agreeing
with Sen. DeConcini that a judge who disregards dispositive legislative history to create his own
definitions exemplified "bedrock activism"); Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1986) (statement of Justice-designate Scalia) (asserting that use
of legislative history depends on "how genuine a representation of the congressional intent it seems
to be").
27. Wald, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. at 305 (cited in note 11); Wald, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 207-13 (cited
in note 6).
28. Eskridge, 37 UCLA L. Rev. at 683 (cited in note 7).
29. Even this approach is not guaranteed to be effective. See Jefferson B. Fordham and J.
Russell Leach, Interpretationof Statutes in Derogationof the Common Law, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 438,
450-51 & nn.74-75 (1950) (cataloguing judicial disregard of statutes directing courts to avoid strict
construction of legislation in derogation of the common law).
30. Cal. Civ. Code § 4 (1872) (cited in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d
1226, 1234 (1975)).
31. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
32. Id. § 1922.
33. Id. § 1928. Whether these statutes result in greater judicial sensitivity to legislative policy
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Although a full exploration of the merits of particular normative
canons is beyond the scope of this essay, a Congress controlled by moderate-liberal Democrats may well find that several of the normative canons most aggressively employed by the Rehnquist Court warrant
statutory modification. For example, the Court's 1985 innovation requiring Congress to specify clearly in the statutory text when it intends
its directives to be applied to state governments"4 may prove to be so
contrary to what Congress actually intends that sponsors of legislation
affecting states will rally behind a modification of the Supreme Court's
standard. The Court's standard may prove particularly offensive as applied to statutes enacted prior to 1985 when prevailing Supreme Court
decisions suggested that less positive indicia of congressional intent
would be sufficient. 5
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have also called for reconsideration of the canon narrowly construing grants from the government to
private parties. Although there is merit in preventing narrow special
interests from obtaining any more of the public largesse than Congress
has clearly authorized, Eskridge and Frickey question why the same canon should be applied to poor recipients of public welfare.3 6 Professor
Sunstein has echoed this concern with a proposed canon to ensure
against irrational or arbitrary deprivations of welfare benefits so as to
effectuate a normative position that society ought to provide a "social
safety net" for the economically disadvantaged."
Congress also might focus its attention on the controversial trend
toward almost complete deference to agency interpretations of their
own statutes. In 1980, when the federal judiciary was dominated at the
inferior level by appointees of Democratic presidents, the Senate overwhelmingly adopted the Bumpers Amendment, which prohibited the
courts from deferring to administrative constructions of statutes. 8
preferences in Pennsylvania is beyond the scope of this essay.
34. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
35. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of The House
Committee of the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1990) (testimony of Professor William N.
Eskridge, Jr.).
36. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip E. Frickey, Legislation:Statutes and the Creationof
Public Policy 657-58 (West, 1989). This canon is particularly suspect in light of its inconsistent
application. For example, in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979), the Court
declined to apply the canon to a statute favoring wealthy and powerful railroads. Instead it
broadly construed the statutory grant of land to those railroads.
37. Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 474 (cited in note 9).
38. Technically, the Senate rejected a motion to table (kill) the proposal, which was offered
as an amendment to S.1477, the Federal Courts Improvements Act. 125 Cong. Rec. 23,499 (Sept.
7, 1979). The amendment provided that courts reviewing administrative regulations shall "interpret constitutional and statutory provisions ... [with] no presumption that any rule or regulation
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Since then, Republicans have taken over both the White House and
political control of administrative agencies and have appointed an overwhelming majority of sitting federal judges.
Moreover, the administrative deference that the Senate found so
objectionable in 1980 is nothing compared to the deference given by
courts today. Indeed, Judge Carl McGowan opined that he saw nothing
in the Bumpers Amendment that "would stop me or any other judge
from going about our interpretive job in the way we always have. '3 9 At
that time, the view of moderate and nonideological judges such as
Judge Edward Tamm was that reviewing courts would defer to agencies
when special administrative expertise was actually present or when the
judges believed that Congress actually delegated or acquiesced in the
interpretation.4 "
The role played by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the development
of this area of law demonstrates how far we have come since 1980.
Judge Ginsburg used the occasion of the University of Georgia's 1981
Sibley Lecture to criticize the Bumpers Amendment, defending judicial
deference to agency interpretations as appropriate in many circumstances.4 1 Within the same year, she wrote an opinion reversing the
Federal Election Commission, carefully explaining why the inconsistent
and ill-considered interpretation by the Commission was not entitled to
deference.4 2 She was unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court
which ruled that courts must uphold any reasonable administrative interpretation, even those involving pure questions of statutory interpretation.43 Several years later, Judge Ginsburg wrote a decision reversing
an Environmental Protection Agency regulation as contrary to law. The
statute, the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, had been passed by a Democratic House and Senate and signed by President Carter. 44 Judge Ginsburg concluded that Ann Gorsuch, President Reagan's environmental
administrator, erred in reversing a Carter administration regulation
that required factories in areas with poor air quality always to use the
of any agency is valid." Id. at 23,478. The vote on the motion to table was 27 to 51. Id. at 23,499.
The bill ultimately passed the Senate but died in the House Judiciary Committee. See Index, 125
Cong. Rec. pt. 29, at 2006 (1979).
39. Carl McGowan, Remarks to the Section of Administrative Law, Ass'n of Am. Law
Schools 7 (Jan. 4, 1981) (quoted in Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal"
or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 539, 552 n.72 (1981)).
40. See, for example, Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
41. Ginsburg, 15 Ga. L. Rev. at 550-53 (cited in note 39).
42. DemocraticSen. Camp. Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 660 F.2d 773, 776-77 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
43. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Sen. Camp. Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
44. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (1988).
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best available technology in cleaning the air. Despite what Judge Ginsburg and the D.C. Circuit found was that statute's overall raison d'9tre
of improving air quality,45 Gorsuch's regulation allowed factories in
dirty-air areas to install new equipment that fell short of the best available technology as long as there was no net increase in pollution from
the factory.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.," the Supreme Court reversed Judge Ginsburg's ruling. Once a reviewing court determined that the construction was not contrary to
clear congressional intent because Congress "has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue," the Supreme Court indicated that a
court's interpretive skills should be put aside and the agency interpretation should prevail as long as it is plausible.47
More recently, Supreme Court decisions have upheld administrative constructions even when they are contrary to rules of syntax and
grammar that normally indicate congressional policy preferences. 48 Reagan and Bush judicial appointees have demonstrated aggressive deference to administrative constructions developed by Reagan and Bush
administrators even though those constructions may be contrary to the
policy preferences expressed in the statutes and debates of Democratic
Congresses. This situation may well suggest that the time is ripe for
Congress to revisit this issue.
On balance, however, it is unlikely that even these more extreme
normative canons will be overturned by statute. There is little to be
gained politically by abstract amendments to the United States Code.
Moreover, any effort to amend legislatively a normative canon is likely
to encounter organized opposition. Whether the opposition is politically
powerful 49 or is limited to moral appeals,50 it has the powerful force of
45. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726-27 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd as Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
46. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
47. Id. at 843-44, n.9.
48. See, for example, Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (1986). Young
concerned the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, providing that when dangerous substances
are required in food preparation, the Food and Drug Administration "shall promulgate regulations
limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as [it] finds necessary for the protection of
public health." 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1988). As Professor Sunstein observed, the syntax of the statute
suggests that the FDA has discretion to decide on the tolerance level for dangerous substances but
not to decline to promulgate regulations at all. Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 465 (cited in note 9).
Yet Young, citing the principle of deference to administrators, upheld the FDA's decision to promulgate no regulations.
49. The President, who institutionally favors deference to his agencies' interpretations, and
the various representatives of state governors and legislators are politically powerful interest
groups. Compare Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 1.16.080 (West 1961) (overriding a canon interpreting
ambiguities against application of a statute interfering with state sovereignty).
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inertia on its side. Moreover, the opposition often will be able to find
some cases where reliance on the challenged canon led to a result
favorable to most legislators. 51
Finally, Democratic legislators should be wary of passing a modernday Bumpers Amendment in today's interpretive environment. True,
abolition of the extreme deference to administrative agencies would be
preferable to these legislators if combined with a "reader-friendly" interpretive regime where judges truly sought to give effect to congressional intent. But today, repeal of the Chevron doctrine would leave
judges free either to give their own personal interpretation to the "plain
meaning" of the statutory text regardless of the existence of reliable
indicia of congressional intent,5 2 or to frustrate both congressional and
administrative constructions by interpreting the statute in light5 3of
other normative canons based on the judiciary's policy preferences.
With respect to many other normative canons, one can predict with
even greater confidence that Congress will not and should not legislatively overrule them. It is probably true that, in the heat of politically
charged consideration of a new crime bill, members of Congress do not
intend for particular provisions to be construed narrowly;54 likewise, as
members line up to gain political advantage in complex tax legislation,
they may well not intend their exemptions to be read strictly.5 5 But if
confronted with the question, outside the heat of the particular battle,
of whether the rule of lenity and the rule of narrow construction of tax
exemptions are desirable interpretive principles, most members probably would respond affirmatively. The values of due process and concern
50. Native American rights groups, who would oppose any modification to the normative canon construing statutes against diminishment of Native rights, often assert influence on Congress
through moral appeals.
51. The same "federalism" public values underlying the normative canon that requires a
clear statement before federal statutes will be deemed to apply to state governments also underlie
the normative canon requiring a clear statement before federal regulatory statutes will be deemed
to preempt state or local regulation. Thus, although liberal legislators may complain about decisions such as Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), which refused to apply a
federal statute to victims of wrongdoing by a state hospital, they may cheer decisions such as Fort
Halifax Packing Company, Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), which refused to read ERISA or the
National Labor Relations Act as preempting a Maine statute requiring plant-closing employers to
provide severance pay.
52. Ross, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 399 at 421-25 (cited in note 8).
53. For a catalogue and critique of these normative canons that serve to trump all but the
clearest expressions of Congressional intent, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Super Clear Statement Rules as Backdoor Constitutional Lawmaking?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992).
54. Compare United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (recognizing that uncertainty in criminal statutes should be resolved by the rule of "lenity" in favor of the defendant).
55. Compare United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988) (recognizing the
"principle that exemptions from taxation are not to be implied").
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about unwarranted imposition of criminal sanctions are widely held
"background values." Legislators also share with Maceian academics an
understanding of the ways that special interest groups can distort legislation like tax bills.56
The fact that Congress is unlikely to enact statutes reversing normative canons does not mean, however, that Congress can do nothing to
protect itself from judicial abuse of those canons. Keep in mind that
normative canons are all presumptions, or "clear statement rules." If
Congress speaks clearly enough, the courts will give effect to its intent
to diminish Native rights, violate international law, intrude into state
governmental responsibilities, withdraw traditional discretion from
courts of equity, or impose significantly increased burdens on the federal judiciary despite normative canons to the contrary.57 Thus, one way
to minimize, if not avoid entirely, situations in which congressional intent is frustrated by normative canons is for legislative drafters to be
more fully cognizant of how judges are likely to interpret their handiwork. One workable approach would be for the Congressional Research
Service's American Law Division to compile and publish periodically a
list of normative canons being employed by the courts. This "checklist"
could then be used by attorneys on the staff of the House and Senate
Legislative Counsels.58 For example, when draft legislation appears to
56. One could argue that the federalism canons enforced with vigor by the Rehnquist Court
similarly reflect Congress's long-term values. I would disagree with the notion that Congress prefers that courts require it to express in statutory text any intent to apply its mandates to states
notwithstanding clear legislative history. Compare Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (imposing such a super-strong clear statement rule). But I confess to having only my personal impressions
as a former Senate staffer to support my view. The key point to Part I of this paper, however, is
that it seems quite hypocritical for those who reject the Eskridge/Sunstein/Macey public values
approach to statutory interpretation to embrace such a restriction on Congressional prerogatives
without positive evidence that Congress really does prefer such an interpretive norm.
Although I am still researching the issue, it seems that the justification for these "superstrong" clear statement rules protecting states' rights can also be criticized as fundamentally inconsistent with the insights of Dean Jesse Choper that the national political process is fully capable of protecting state interests. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process, ch. IV (U. Chi., 1980). The endorsement of Choper's insights was critical to the Supreme
Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth'y, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) in
which the Court refused to use the Tenth Amendment to invalidate federal laws affecting states'
rights.
57. The first three normative canons are among those catalogued in Eskridge and Frickey,
Legislation at 655 (cited in note 36) (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (discussing Native rights); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (discussing international law); Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (discussing state prerogatives)). The latter canon was
identified in Wald, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 210 (cited in note 6) (citing Bread PoliticalAction Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1982)).
58. I unfortunately cannot claim credit for originating the idea of the increased use of the
legislative counsel's office to improve statutory interpretation. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Continuing Challenge, in Robert A. Katzmann, ed., Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional
Comity 183-84 (Brookings Institution, 1988).
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impose duties on state governments, these attorneys could notify the
author of the bill that express abrogation of state sovereign immunity
will be necessary to secure judicial enforcement of these duties, and the
legislator then would be able to make a judgment about the political
viability of such an express provision.

IV.

THE USE OF DESCRIPTIVE CANONS

Descriptive canons of statutory interpretation raise different issues.
By and large, descriptive canons are somewhat accurate generalizations
of the way legislators communicate through statutory text. Perhaps
commentators are correct that the most controversial descriptive canon-inclusio unius est exclusio alterius-isso inaccurate in describing
how members of Congress draft legislation 59 that Congress can be persuaded to disavow it by statute. As for the canon that nothing in statutory text can be treated as surplusage, even if Congress were too
embarassed to admit to its sloppy drafting habits by overturning the
canon itself, perhaps this canon too is so contrary to real life experience
that courts should simply stop using it 6 °
Judge Posner also has criticized other descriptive canons on accuracy grounds, including the one disfavoring repeals by implication. 1
Posner is surely right that congressional drafters do not comb the
United States Code for possible inconsistencies and explicitly repeal all
those that they find. But it may well be accurate to suppose that a busy
Congress of limited prescience might fully support judicial use of this
canon, precisely to avoid the political embarrassment of accidentally re59. The inclusio unius canon states that when Congress includes some things in a statutory
list it has excluded everything not named in the statute. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The
Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 282 (Harvard, 1985). Professor Sunstein notes that "[the failure to refer explicitly to the group in question may reflect inadvertence, inability to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the decision to the courts, rather than an implicit negative legislative
decision on the subject." Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 455 (cited in note 9).
60. As Judge Posner correctly observes, this canon is based on the "improbable proposition"
of "legislative omniscience." Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 812-13 (1983). Some courts seem to have caught on to
the existence of surplusage caused by sloppy drafting. See, for example, Montana Wilderness
Ass'n, Nine QuarterCircle Ranch v. United States Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 954-55 n.4 (9th Cir.
1981).
Even if legislative drafters were omniscient, a number of scenarios exist in which language
that appears to most readers to be superfluous winds up in enacted statutes. A hyper-sensitive
drafter, perhaps spurred on by a special interest group, might insist on inserting a provision that
does no more than restate the terms of another provision using language that appears to be clearer
to the drafter. Alternatively, a legislator, either for herself or for the benefit of a friendly lobbyist,
may insist that a superfluous phrase that originally appeared in her bill remain in compromise
legislation, so she can claim credit for securing passage of this particular provision. (I thank my
classmate Ed Weil for this insight.)
61. Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 812-13 (cited in note 60).
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pealing desirable legislative provisions." This is particularly true when
one considers the increasing specialization and turf fights within Congress, and the members' interest in not having legislation enacted by
another committee inadvertently affect statutes previously enacted
under their watchful eye.
In any event, as Llewellyn noted, virtually all descriptive canons
are subject to refutation by counter-canons that call for a different result when a contrary legislative purpose appears. Llewellyn's remarks
demonstrate how at least five of the most commonly used descriptive
canons are disregarded when they would result in an interpretation contrary to congressional purposes. First, statutes in pari materia are to be
construed together, but not "where a legislative design to depart from
the general purpose or policy of previous enactments may be apparent."6 3 Second, judges are generally to give words their ordinary meaning unless they are technical terms, but ordinary words may have a
technical meaning and technical words should be construed in ordinary
terms if necessary to conform to congressional intent. 4 Third, words
should be interpreted according to principles of grammar unless such
an interpretation would undermine the statute's purpose.6 5 Fourth,
ejusdem generis "is only an aid in getting the meaning and does not
warrant confining the operations of a statute within narrower limits
than were intended." 6 Finally, permissible and mandatory words are
intrepreted differently, but permissible words may be read as
mandatory and mandatory words may be read as permissible when con67
gressional intent requires such a construction.
These canons could, of course, be converted into normative ones.
The federal judiciary could decide to act as Congress's kindergarten
teacher and insist, for example, that the desirability of having Congress
use proper grammar to communicate justifies judicial refusal to give effect to a meaning that Congress clearly intended in order to force Congress to clean up its act. At least to date, though, no serious effort has
been made, even by the textualists, to convert the descriptive canons
into normative ones. As long as these canons remain descriptive, by definition they will be subject to modification by reliable indicia of legislative intent. Thus, the key strategy for Congress in ensuring that its
policy preferences are not frustrated by judicial abuse of descriptive ca62. Mexico's legislature has expressly adopted an interpretive statute codifying this canon.
Codigo Civil para el Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] art. 9.
63. Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 402 (cited in note 1).
64. Id. at 404.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 405.
67. Id. at 406.
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nons is to manifest unequivocally its purpose.
V.

POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DESCRIPTIVE CANONS

One workable way of ensuring that Congress's purposes are clear is
to minimize situations where statutory language invokes a descriptive
canon contrary to the legislative intent because of the drafters' ignorance of the canon. 8 Suppose, for example, that a modern day trade
committee approves legislation imposing a tariff on fruits but not vegetables, and it wishes to protect homegrown tomatoes. The sponsors
might leave the text as drafted, knowing that, botanically speaking, tomatoes are fruits of the vine. This decision would reflect, however, an
ignorance of the venerable canon that words are to be given their ordinary meaning."9 As with normative canons, each chamber's legislative
counsel could use a checklist of canons developed by the Congressional
Research Service to notify drafters of how their statutes are likely to be
interpreted by judges. 70
Despite attacks on the use of legislative history by Justice Scalia
and some lower court judges, each of the other justices signed Justice
White's majority opinion in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,
which pointedly rejected Scalia's critique and insisted that courts would
continue to use legislative history.7 1 Thus, it is inconceivable that, to
use the tomato tariff illustration, the courts would insist on applying
the ordinary meaning canon in the face of clear language in a commit68. Judge Abner Mikva once remarked that when he served in Congress, "the only 'canons'
we talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight." Abner J.
Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 627, 629 (1987).
69. Indeed, legisprudes will recognize that the hypothetical is drawn from Nix v. Hedden,
149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893), which applied the ordinary meaning of tomato to classify it as a
vegetable.
70. Professor Eric Lane suggests that "even if the bill drafters were aware of the rules of
construction, they could not abide by them." Eric Lane, Legislative Process and its Judicial
Renderings:A Study in Contrast, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 639, 657 (1987). He applies this suggestion
with some accuracy to the normative canon that remedial statutes are broadly construed, arguing
that legislators might find compromise more difficult if they really understood how judges might
broaden the enacted text. Id. But he errs when it comes to descriptive canons. A drafter's resolution of the tomato-as-fruit illustration cited in the text is one clear example.
Professor Lane's critique of the use of the in pari materia canon also misses the mark. See id.
at 657-58. Lane, of course, is correct in noting that consistency among statutes is not a dominant
concern for many bills. But this canon is only properly invoked when the text and background of a
more recent statute indicate (often through identical wording of key provisions) that the legislature intended its later work to reflect its intent as expressed in the earlier legislation. Although
legislative drafters cannot be expected to be fully cognizant of the entire statutory corpus juris, it
is unlikely that drafters will use virtually identical language from related statutes by accident. For
an example of a sound use of this canon, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (holding that
the right to a jury trial permitted in the Fair Labor Standards Act also applied to the Age Discrimination Act because the text, structure, and history of the two statutes were in pari materia).
71. 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2485 n.4 (1991).
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tee report or a sponsor's floor statement indicating that tomatoes were
to be considered fruits. Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement
that official congressional documents are replete with deceptive statements that suggest a congressional intent that does not in fact exist.
The following modifications in congressional practices would significantly reduce the likelihood that courts will be deceived by inaccurate
legislative history or will ignore legislative history for fear of such
deception.
A.

Publish the Transcript of Mark-ups

Although the majority of words enacted into the United States
Code are no doubt originally drafted during private meetings, far more
consideration of statutory text occurs at committee and subcommittee
mark-ups than on the floor of either House. These mark-ups are not
published-a circumstance which perhaps reflects a time when markups, unlike hearings and general debate, usually took place in closed
session. 72 Today, drafting of statutory language often occurs during
mark-ups; in addition, the sponsor or chief committee staff counsel
often explains in plain English the meaning of words in the working
draft. Similarly, members offering amendments usually provide explanations for their proposed additions or deletions to the draft. Because
committee members frequently rely on these explanations, they could,
should, and would be given considerable weight were they publicly
available.
B. Have Members Sign Committee Reports
Justice Scalia has criticized judicial reliance on committee reports
because their contents, he alleges, are "inserted, at best by a committee
staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee
staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist. 7 s However, committee staffers draft virtually all statutory text as well, often at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist, and members rarely read the statutory
text. In my own experience as an attorney for the Senate Judiciary
Committee, matters inserted in a committee report at the initiative of a
committee staffer usually reflected either a consensus among staffers
about the committee's intent or the interests of the staffer's boss. When
lawyer-lobbyists succeed in adding favorable language to committee re72. Mark-up sessions were opened to the public in the mid-1970s as part of a general reform
of procedures, especially in the House of Representatives. Reformers believed that open mark-ups
would reduce the influence of special-interest groups. See Abner J. Mikva and Patti B. Saris, The
American Congress: The First Branch 294 (1983).
73. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
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ports, it is often because a member, not a staffer, has decided to support whatever details the particular special interest desires.
Unlike statements of the managers of a conference committee,
committee reports are unsigned, except by the Chair and those offering
additional views. As a result, some committee reports are published
without the concurrence of a majority of the committee members; these
reports may not coincide with the full committee's intent. Although
Justice Scalia's harsh criticism reflects an unrealistic view of the legislative process, obtaining members' signatures on a committee report will
mean that the members either (a) read the report; (b) were assured that
the report was acceptable by staff who read the report and who had the
trust and confidence of members; or (c) consciously decided that any
matters acceptable to the chair, ranking member, or other colleague
with greater expertise in the area were acceptable to them. This change
should increase the authoritative weight of committee reports. Moreover, securing these signatures should not pose more difficult logistical
problems than securing signatures on the statements of managers of
conference committees.
C. Expressly Indicate Why Committee Hearings and Floor
Statements Should Be Authoritative
Certain floor statements should be given substantial weight by
courts in interpreting statutes. Other statements are less reliable. Legislators can, however, assist judges in separating the wheat from the chaff
by leaving probative, relatively tamper-free clues in the record. The
most reliable statements fall into two major categories: (1) statements
by the sponsor of the legislation or the particular provision at issue
when it appears that members who might otherwise desire to amend
the bill have relied on those statements; and (2) colloquies between the
"major players" concerning a legislative provision when it appears that
the majority of members are prepared to follow any consensus reached
by these individuals.
To aid courts in distinguishing reliable from unreliable legislative
history, those in a position to make authoritative statements should include in their remarks information about the context to give courts confidence that the remarks accurately reflect the legislative intent.
Sponsors and major players should identify themselves as such. When
floor statements are made that represent a consensus, one of the leaders
of each party or the chair and ranking minority committee member
should so indicate. Those who now create false legislative history are
unlikely to misstate their own role in the legislative process without affronting committee and House leaders with whom they must continue
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to work.74
The Senate seemed to have recognized the usefulness of this proposal in connection with deliberations concerning recent civil rights legislation.7 5 When the Senate agreed to a compromise which was
introduced as an amendment to the pending legislation by Senator
John Danforth (and cosponsored by the other major "players," including Senators Edward Kennedy, Robert Dole and George Mitchell), Danforth also introduced, with the apparent acquiescence of the other
cosponsors, a three paragraph statement entitled "Exclusive Legislative
History" to explain the significance of some key phrases in the Act."
Subsequent efforts by all partisans to put their own personal gloss on
the "exclusive legislative history" are likely to be less authoritative, and
the agreed-upon statement is likely to be more reliable than would otherwise be the case.
D. Specify Which Remarks Are Directed at the Courts
Judge James Buckley has observed that instructions contained in
legislative history often are directed to agencies rather than courts. The
expectation is that inconsistent agency action will lead not to judicial
reversal but to political retribution at the next budget cycle or at some
other convenient opportunity. 77 When an explanation of textual meaning is given for the purpose of explaining what the bill means legally
(i.e., how it should be interpreted in the judicial system) rather than
politically, the speaker should expressly say so.
These four changes would have only a minimal effect on the current operation of either House. Yet they would give guideposts to
74. For example, the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1988), requires the
Attorney General to find that a newspaper was failing prior to authorizing an antitrust exemption.

The Act defined a failing newspaper as one that "is in probable danger of financial failure." Id.
§ 1802(5). This phrase was added to the bill as an amendment during the House Judiciary Committee mark-up by Representative Thomas Railsback (R-Illinois). Railsback was a particularly im-

portant "player" concerning this statute because he had reservations about the legislation. See 116
Cong. Rec. 23,146 (July 8, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, the bill's floor manager,
explaining Rep. Railsback's role in the process). On the House floor, Rep. Railsback explained his
view that the bill as reported by the Judiciary Committee was a "substantial improvement[]" on
the bill as introduced, in part because of his amendment which, in his words, "sharply restricted"
the scope of the exemption "by circumscribing [the Attorney General's] power to consent through

the use of a strict definition of 'failing newspaper.'" Id. at 23,154. Perhaps misled in part because
the explanation of Railsback's role was separated from his remarks in the record, a reviewing court
gave no credit to this history and instead upheld a broad definition of the term "probable danger
of financial failure." Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1285
(D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd per curiam, 110 S. Ct. 398 (1989) (affirmed by an equally divided court).

75. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 102 Pub. L. No. 166, 105 Stat. 1071.
76.
77.

137 Cong. Rec. 15,276 (Oct. 25, 1991).
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 716-17 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(Buckley concurring).
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judges and make the process of legislative interpretation more reliable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In one of the most important contributions to the legal literature
from the Vanderbilt Law Review, or any journal for that matter, Karl
Llewellyn's critique of the canons of statutory construction is as accurate and insightful today 's it was in 1950. Llewellyn emphasized that a
statute "must be read in the light of some assumed purpose" if it is to
make any sense.7 8 Llewellyn, however, did not deal with many of the
normative canons employed by courts today. Those canons do not purport to reflect congressional intent; instead they are canons which direct
courts to construe ambiguities in some particular way to further judicial
policy objectives- Ironically, even justices who rail against judicial activism seem to use these canons to impose their own political values. Congress, therefiore, must contribute to the creation of the "public values"
that shape statutory interpretation. Greater congressional contribution
to this area may prevent the purpose of a statute from becoming a judicially "assumed purpose" rather than a legislatively created one.
As for descriptive canons, Llewellyn deftly illustrated how courts
can easily abuse them to frustrate congressional policy preferences. At a
time when other judicial techniques of statutory and constitutional interpretation, such as the use of plain meaning in lieu of legislative history and the constitutional rejection of legislative vetoes 7 9 may also
frustrate congressional intent, it is critical that legislators focus on how
they can assure that courts give due recognition to their primacy in
policymaking. Specific statutes overruling normative canons that
neither accurately describe congressional intent nor reflect sound interpretive policies warrant serious congressional consideration. More feasibly, increased scrutiny of drafting by the legislative counsel's office to
ensure that representatives and judges are speaking the same language
and minor procedural changes that increase the reliability of certain
forms of legislative history can aid both legislators and judges of good
will.

78.
79.

Llewelyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 400 (cited in note 1).
See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983).

